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TERRORIST CRIME, TALIBAN GUILT, WESTERN
VICTIMS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
MARK A. DRUMBL*
On September 1lth, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorists attacked the United States and
killed approximately 3,000 civilians from 81 countries.'
Traditionally,
international law treats armed attacks differently than criminal attacks. States
launch armed attacks against other states; organized insurgency movements having
some level of command or political structure also may launch internal armed
attacks against state governments. Individuals or groups, on the other hand,
initiate criminal attacks.
The law responds to criminal attacks through
investigation and trial. The law permits states to use force against other states in
self-defense to armed attacks. 2 The September 11th attack was a war-like attack
undertaken against a state by individuals from other states operating through a nonstate actor that has some command and political structure.3 As such, it does not
cleanly fit into either the armed attack or criminal attack category. In fact, it blurs
the distinction between the two.
Unsurprisingly, the U.S. response to the attack drew from both categories.
First, the U.S. argued that the Taliban harbored al-Qaeda and, consequently, the
attack was an armed attack attributable to Afghanistan. Therefore, the U.S. (and
its allies) had the right to initiate military strikes in collective self-defense. 4 These
strikes converted Afghanistan's internal armed conflict into an international one.
The strikes and subsequent ground campaign were militarily successful, prompting
the abdication of the Taliban, destruction of terrorist infrastructure and personnel,
and capture of thousands of fighters. 5 The follow-up response was one of both
criminal and military justice: apprehending, detaining, and prosecuting some alQaeda operatives and Taliban fighters. Thus far, two prosecutorial strategies have
Assistant Professor, School of Law, Washington & Lee University. E-mail: drumblm@wlu.edu.
1. Terrorists have not remained inactive since September 1lh; there have since been devastating
attacks in the Philippines, Indonesia, Yemen, Kuwait, Pakistan, Russia, and Afghanistan, some of
which have been closely connected to al-Qaeda.
2. See e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapter7.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
3. See Mark Drumbl, Judging the 11th September Terrorist Attack, 24 HUMAN RTs. Q. 323
(2002).
4. See U.N. Charter, supra note 2, at art. 51. See also War Powers Resolution, 50 USCS § 1541
(2002).
5. See No Remedy for Atrocities, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2002, at A22. See also Let the Rule of
Justice Prevail,THE IRISH NEWS LIMITED, Dec. 12, 2001, p. 6 (detailing the actions taken against the
Taliban as well as the results); Voice of the Times, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEwS, Nov. 27, 2001, at B5
(discussing the impact U.S. strikes have had on Osama Bin Laden's freedom to move about
Afghanistan).
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emerged: U.S. federal courts or U.S. military commissions having jurisdiction only
over foreign nationals. Although the commissions and their regulations contain
some due process protections, as currently envisioned they do not provide
defendants the same level of protection as the federal courts or the courts-martial
(conducted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice).6 Some foreign national
courts also have initiated judicial proceedings.7 Large numbers of terrorist
suspects remain in detention in many countries world-wide.
Thus, the U.S. simultaneously wages an armed conflict while it undertakes a
criminal investigation. As such, Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were combatants
for the purpose of justifying the lethal use of force. Once captured, they became
criminal detainees for the purpose of criminal and military justice, although not
true criminal detainees insofar as some may be tried outside the criminal justice
system by military commissions and thereby avoid the due process protections
given criminal defendants in U.S. courts. However, the fact that these detainees
were captured as combatants in an armed conflict means that, as they become
defendants facing trial, they may retain important rights, specifically the rights
accorded to prisoners of war by the Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War. 8 In
February 2002, the U.S. affirmed that Taliban detainees were entitled to the
coverage of the Geneva Conventions whereas al-Qaeda fighters were not. 9 Yet the
U.S. denied prisoner of war status to all detainees.' 0 According to the Geneva
Conventions, the actual determination of whether an individual is or is not a
prisoner of war is to be made by a tribunal, not unilaterally by a party to the armed
conflict." Until such a determination is made, the detainees are to be treated as
prisoners of war. 12 Thus, the U.S. declaration that it is abiding by the Geneva
Conventions may not be accurate, as this declaration arguably was not been
followed by strict adherence to the actual terms of the Conventions.
Given that prisoners of war were formerly soldiers authorized to use force,
they cannot be prosecuted for acts lawfully committed under that authorization
(e.g. killing and wounding the enemy).13 They only can be prosecuted for
activities that exceed that authorization, such as war crimes. Prisoners of war are
guaranteed the right to be tried by the same courts, under the same procedure, and
6. See How to Trya Terrorist,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,2001, at A32.
7. See generally Frank Davies, US. Has Many Choices of Courts in Dealing with Terrorists,
Knight Ridder, Dec. 19, 2001. On February 19, 2003, a Moroccan student, Mounir el Motassadeq, who
provided logistical support for the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell (which included lead September 11 hijacker
Mohammed Atta), was convicted in Germany of over 3,000 counts of accessory to murder and
sentenced to the maximum 15 years' imprisonment.
8. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, openedfor signature
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
9. See David Stout, Geneva Convention to Be Applied to Captured Taliban Fighters, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002.
10. See id.
11. Geneva Convention, supra note 8, art. 5.
12. Id.
13. See generally Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, InternationalHuman Rights Law In Practice:
The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2
CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001).

2002

TERRORIST CRIME, TALIBAN GUILT, WESTERN VICTIMS

with the same appeal rights as are members of the armed forces of the detaining
power.14 They are to be sentenced to the same penalties. 15 There are also rights to
counsel, to confer privately with counsel, to pre-trial assistance by counsel (for
example during interrogation), and to call witnesses.' 6 While awaiting trial,
prisoners of war are to be housed in the same conditions as their captors.' 7 In any
event, regardless of their status as prisoners of war, all detainees are entitled to the
protection of international human rights law, customary international law, and
other treaties.
Although the rules regarding commission procedure (issued in March 2002
after a draft had been circulated in December 2001) narrowed many of the gaps
between the initial construction of the commissions and international law,' 8 there
are still reasons to fear that the planned military commissions (together with the
ongoing detentions in which individuals have not yet been charged) do not fully
meet these standards.' 9 Skirting international humanitarian law places the U.S. in a
weakened position when criticizing rights violations, including those committed
against Americans, in other countries. Sustained Geneva Convention violations by
Iraq affecting Coalition soldiers spring to mind; so, too, do acts of perfidy
undertaken by Iraqi paramilitary forces.
This mixed criminal/military response is understandable. After all, to victims,
the September 11 th attack certainly feels like more than just a crime. It is almost
trivially true that the attack was criminal; and painfully obvious that it involved
murder, injury, hijacking, and property destruction. Prosecuting terrorists under
ordinary criminal law may sanitize their conduct as that of the ordinary criminal.
This may be one reason why military commissions have emotional appeal.
There is, however, another option. Consideration could be given to
prosecuting at least some of those responsible for the attack in an international
tribunal for crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity include acts of the
ultimate despicability that are among the most serious matters of concern to the
international community as a whole. In the past, the U.S. supported international
prosecution for such crimes. For example, following World War II, the U.S.
pushed for an international military tribunal when some Allies sought the summary
execution of captured Nazi leaders.2 ° More recently, the U.S. has strongly
supported the prosecution of crimes against humanity before international tribunals
14. Geneva Convention, supra note 8, art. 82.
15. See id.
16. See id. at art. 105.
17. See id. at art. 103.
18. See Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. I (Mar. 21, 2002). See generally
John Mintz, U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2002).
19. See Jordan Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: CourtingIllegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1 (2002). See also E-mail from Jordan Paust, Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston to
Mark A. Drumbl, Assistant Professor, School of Law, Washington & Lee University (March 21, 2002)
(on file with the author).
20. See Laurie Cohen, Comment: Application of the Realist and Liberal Perspectives to the
Implementation of War Crimes Trials: Case Studies of Nuremburg and Bosnia, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOR. AFF. 113, 123 (1997).
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in many places, including Bosnia, Kosovo, Croatia, Rwanda, and Cambodia.2'
Prosecuting September 1lth as a crime against humanity recognizes both the
criminal as well as war-like nature of the attack, and universally condemns
terrorism in the most serious way possible. It may also eliminate the timeconsuming debate whether the detainees are or are not prisoners of war.
To be sure, there are certain political advantages in proceeding through an
abridged military process. These include expediency, control, incapacitation of
attackers, and security. However, the military commissions may not develop a
comprehensive record of terrorist conduct that fully paints the reprehensibility of
this conduct. Moreover, military commissions will likely be perceived as lacking
in credibility, fairness, legitimacy, and legality in many parts of the world and
among audiences that we should care about. Military commission verdicts may be
expedient because they abridge due process and attenuate public access. However,
due process and public access help prosecutions become venues where competing
narratives clash and are synthesized. This can lead to an overarching narrative
that, if the trial process is viewed as credible, will itself have some legitimacy.
Moreover, military commissions could prompt an externalization of martyrdom
into uncontrolled political fora, such as the Islamic media, where exhortations of
injustice to Muslims may resonate - unchecked - on the very public that must view
terrorism as criminal and cancerous in order for it to be stamped out. Controlling
these perceptions is particularly relevant as Operation Iraqi Freedom takes place.
In the cases of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, international tribunals
have rendered lengthy, comprehensive decisions that have authenticated findings
of fact and complex historical narratives, established some important truths, and
worked to refute myths of ethnic, religious, and gender superiority. 22 To be sure,
international tribunal decisions have not always been well received in these
countries and there has, at times, been a disconnect between the work of the
23
international tribunals and the afflicted societies they were designed to assist.

However, with regard to September 11th, when contrasted with the perfunctory
verdict issued by a military commission, international tribunals offer a greater
possibility for discussion, dissensus, and neutral evaluation.24 Such possibilities
can help ensure that those prosecuted for September 11th are not perceived as
suffering political victor's justice. These perceptions would weaken the creation of

21. See generally War Crimes Tribunals: The Record And The Prospects: Conference
Convocation, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1383 (1998)
22. See generally Josd Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessonsfrom Rwanda, 24 YALE
J. INT'L L. 365 (1999); Symposium: The Fifth Annual Ernst C. Steifel Symposium: 1945-1995: Critical
Perspectives On The Nuremberg Trials And State Accountability: Panel II: Identifying And
Prosecuting War Crimes: Two Case Studies - The Former Yugoslavia And Rwanda, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 631 (1995).
23. This particularly is the case when the international tribunal externalizes justice for what
essentially is an internal conflict, which is the case in Rwanda. See Alvarez, supra note 22, at 395.
However, the September I lth terrorist attack is not an internal conflict, but a transnational one which,
given the broad panoply of victims, aggressors, and participants, quite readily can be cast as a global
crime.
24. See generally id.
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a transnational anti-terrorism consensus.25
An international criminal process captures the evil of the attack, adroitly
involves the global public in eradicating terrorism, and provides the opportunity
for universal cross-cultural condemnation. It also presents a number of strategic
advantages over proceeding domestically.
First, unlike U.S. criminal law,
international criminal law has limited discovery procedures that permit sensitive
information to be controlled. Second, the international tribunal could be situated in
a neutral, isolated location, thereby reducing security threats to the U.S. Witnesses
can testify through voice-altering technology, from behind screens, and there are
no juries. Third, international tribunals have juridical experience with the thorny
questions of command responsibility and conspiracy. Fourth, international
prosecutions offer the benefit of coordination. The September 11th attack involved
victims of multiple nationalities and was planned in multiple locations by a multinational cast of aiders, abettors, and accomplices. Responding internationally can
reduce the transaction costs of coordinating various domestic proceedings. It can
also bridge barriers caused by differential human rights standards among
prosecuting countries. Fifth, a coordinated international approach can lay the
groundwork for a global intelligence network and anti-terrorism police unit.
To be sure, there are drawbacks to international prosecutions. The number of
possible defendants could challenge the capacity of international tribunals
(although this could be mitigated by limiting the scope of the international tribunal
to senior members of al-Qaeda). Funding could be expensive (although so are
domestic trials and military commissions). Should it take too long to organize a
tribunal, the impetus to stamp out terrorism could wane. Moreover, the death
penalty is disfavored under international law.26 This was one of the reasons why
Rwanda initially opposed an international tribunal judging leaders of its 1994
genocide (where 800,000 people were murdered).27 However, the U.S. was one of
the major proponents of the international tribunal for Rwanda, which lacks the
jurisdiction to impose the death penalty. 2 8 There is no principled reason to treat

potential U.S. opposition any differently than the way Rwanda's opposition was
treated. Furthermore, insisting on the death penalty in criminal or military
proceedings may impede the extradition of suspects from abroad and, as may have
occurred in the capital trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, may prompt tensions in
international comity and relations among allies.29

25. Alvarez, supranote 22, at 376, 458-60.
26. See Michelle McKee, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: UnderstandingWhy the United
States' Use of the Death Penalty Violates Customary InternationalLaw, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
153, 153-58, 170 (2000). See also Kristi Tumminello Prinzo, The United States -"Capital" of the
World: An Analysis of Why the United States Practices Capital Punishment While the International
Trend is Towards Its Abolition, 24 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 855, 856-60 (1999).
27. See Christine M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International
Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda and The Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass
Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L. J. 163, 177 (2000).
28. See War Crimes Tribunals: The Record And The Prospects: Conference Convocation, supra
note 21; Alvarez, supranote 22, at 410.
29. See Due Processfor Terrorists, WALL ST. J., March 22, 2002 (discussing how the decision to

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 1:1

Moreover, shying away from the international approach means that we may
be shying away from the precedent we may have created elsewhere. In the past,
the United States has been one of many strong supporters of open international
criminal prosecutions for atrocity in Nazi Germany, Rwanda, Cambodia, East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia.3 0 These "civilized" international trials have been
heralded as milestones in the incremental construction of a culture of human rights
and rule of law that is posited as the "best" way permanently to break the cycles of
violence. 3 ' Although a difficult question, it needs to be asked: should the logic be
any different now that Americans (along with other Westerners) predominantly are
the victims? It shouldn't be, yet it is. Law and due process are now often
rhetorically presented as inconveniences to the pursuit of justice, whereas in other
post-atrocity situations law and due process are rhetorically presented as
requirements for justice.
Whereas the legal responses to Rwandan, Bosnian, Kosovar, Cambodian,
Sierra Leonean and East Timorese atrocity each were internationalized (or, in the
case of Cambodia, is actively sought to be internationalized), the legal response to
September 1 th has decidedly not been internationalized. Despite the fact that
victims come from eighty-one countries and detainees from twenty-five countries,
the legal response to this tragedy has largely remained national and victim-based.
Moreover, the national response (if it proceeds through the planned military
commissions which strategically retain the benefits of national control without
national constitutional or judicial review obligations) may in fact clash with some
law, thereby
important precepts of international humanitarian and human3 rights
2
norms.
international
to
exceptionalism
of
sort
some
evidencing
Among the reasons the international community relied upon to support
international proceedings in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was concern that
domestic proceedings in both regions would be unable to satisfy international due
process concerns. 3 Yet, when the burden of victimization lies principally upon
Americans in particular and Westerners in general, it seems that domestic, victimbased, and territorial prosecutions emerge as a presumptive norm and concerns
with meshing these with international human rights law or humanitarian law are
constructed as inconveniences or as coddling terrorists.3 4 But did the Rwandans
pursue the death penalty against Moussaoui, the alleged 20' hijacker and a French national, in U.S.
district court has sparked a negative reaction in France; more problematic, however, is the question
whether some countries may be under a duty not to extradite an individual on their territory to face a
possible death sentence abroad).
30. See War Crimes Tribunals: The Record And The Prospects: Conference Convocation, supra
note 21.
31. See id.
32. See generally Antje C. Petersen, Extradition and the Political Offense Exception in the
Suppression of Terrorism, 67 IND. L.J. 767 (1992). See also Dino Kritsiotis, ReappraisingPolicy
Objections to HumanitarianIntervention, 19 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 1005 (1998).
33. See generally Osamu Inoue, The Due Process Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards in United States Federal Courts: A Proposalfor a Standard, II AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 247 (2000). See also William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Postgenocide Rwanda: SearchingforSolutions to Impossible Problems,7 CRiM. L.F. 523 (1996).
34. See Lee Casey, Assessments Of The United States Position: The Case Against The
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not feel that the leaders of the genocide were coddled at the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and that the granting of extensive due process to
these individuals (which may be one reason why Ignace Bagilishema was acquitted
(and released) in 2002 and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza temporarily released in
35
Whereas the U.S. strongly supported an
was an inconvenience?
1999)
and Bosnian Muslims through the
for
Rwandans
externalization of justice
36
the U.S. resists externalizing justice for serious
international tribunals,
international crimes, possibly even crimes against humanity, in the case of
terrorism. The legal response to September 1lth may demonstrate that when
Westerners are victims, justice may not be externalized from the West.37 However,
when "others" in "far away" "tribal" societies are victimized (even if by fellow
citizens), then justice for those victims may be subject to externalization in order to
an create international "rule of law."38
To be sure, the national judicial systems in both the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda were destroyed or seen as genuinely unable to prosecute offenders.39 In
fact, the principle of complementarity intrinsic to the International Criminal Court
defers international prosecutions when national courts are genuinely willing or able
to prosecute. Indeed, the U.S. and European national justice systems are those that
would be deemed able and willing to prosecute while respecting international
standards of due process. 40 Notwithstanding this ability to satisfy complementarity
concerns, the United States consciously chose to contract out of its domestic
judicial process and create new military commissions that may run afoul of
international standards and, as such, may not be the kind of domestic mechanisms
that the international community had in mind when seeking to ensure genuine
domestic prosecutions. 41 This is not to deny that the military commissions may be
as "fair" as the normal justice systems of many countries. However, international

InternationalCriminalCourt, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 840 (2002).

35. See Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda; InternationalCriminal Tribunal Chambers Judicial
Recess Starts On Monday, AFRICA NEWS, July 12, 2002.
36. See Alvarez, supra note 22.
37. This is not to deny that, as discussed previously, differences persist among Western nations
regarding the suitability of military commissions. By and large, many European allies are more
circumspect about the merits of the commissions; they also express reservations regarding the death
penalty and the absence of certain procedural safeguards. However, as I have argued elsewhere, many
of these differences may be more rhetorical than substantive and may represent differences of degree
rather than differences of kind. See Drumbl, supra note 3. True, allies had criticized the U.S. decision
not to declare the Geneva Conventions as applicable, but when the U.S. declared them applicable while
refusing actually to apply the procedural and substantive content of those Conventions, allies were
satisfied.
38. See Alvarez, supra note 22.
39. See Tara Sapru, Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Foray of the Security
Council Tribunal into the Rwandan Crisis, 32 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 329 (1997). See also Alvarez, supra
note 22.
40. See Douglass Cassel, The ICC's New Legal Landscape: The Need To Expand U.S. Domestic
Jurisdiction To Prosecute Genocide, War Crimes, And Crimes Against Humanity, 23 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 378 (1999).
41. See generally James D. Fry, Terrorism As A Crime Against Humanity And Genocide: The
Backdoor To UniversalJurisdiction,7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 169 (2002).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 1:1

institutions were designed to "take over" unless these normal justice systems could
approximate international standards.42
It is not as if domestic infrastructure destruction is the cause of the United
States' decision to skirt domestically recognized standards of due process. VicePresident Cheney flatly insists that accused terrorists do not deserve the "same
standards and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen" and that a
military commission is appropriate insofar as accused individuals will be given the
"kind of treatment... we believe they deserve." 43 The President refers to detainees
that await trial as "killers."" Yet the United States was supportive of an
international tribunal for Rwanda that gave the leaders of the Rwandan genocide
treatment vastly superior to that of the Rwandan domestic criminal justice system,
along with more lenient punishments.45
Moreover criminal accountability for the Taliban has, thus far, largely been
limited to the September 11th attacks. But what about the other crimes allegedly
committed by the Taliban? During its rule over Afghanistan, the Taliban is
reported to have terrorized Afghans through forced deportations, massacres,
torture, extra-judicial executions, and enforced disappearances among prisoners.46
Shia Muslims were persecuted.47 The Taliban established a system of gender
apartheid. 48 There were many allegations of state-sponsored sexual crimes and
rape.49 In addition, the Taliban embarked on deliberate destruction of cultural
property (e.g. the ancient Bamiyan Buddhas and objects d'art in the National
Museum in Kabul). 50
The international community did not intercede in
Afghanistan while these crimes were occurring. Early intervention to protect

42. See generally Alvarez, supra note 22; see also Carroll, supra note 27, at 193.
43. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Steven Lee Myers, Senior Administration Officials Defend Military
Tribunalsfor TerroristSuspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B6.
44. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Rules Set on Afghan War Prosecutions,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002,
at Al.
45. See Schabas, supra note 33, at 551-52 (illustrating that whereas Rwandan domestic courts
have awarded the death penalty, the ICTR is not empowered to do so; thus, the leaders of the Rwandan
genocide, over whom the ICTR has custody, are entitled to more advanced procedural protections and
avoid the death penalty, whereas the "lower-down" offenders in the custody of the Rwandan
government have less procedural protection but face more severe sentences).
46. See Ossai Miazad, Transitional Justice in Post-war Afghanistan, 9 HuM. RTS. BR. 2, 2-6
(2002). See also David Treyster, The Taliban May No Longer Control Afghanistan, but Their
Persecutionof Religious Minorities Will Forever Remain a Stain on GlobalHistory, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 527, 527-532 (2002).
47. See Treyster, supra note 46, at 529.
48. See generally Alicia Galea, No Freedom for Afghan Women: The Taliban Hides Behind
Religion To Control Its People, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 341 (2001). See also Anastasia Telesetsky,
In the Shadows and Behind the Veil: Women in Afghanistan Under Taliban Rule, 13 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 293 (1998); Shannon Middleton, Women's Rights Unveiled: Taliban's Treatment of
Women in Afghanistan, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 421 (2001).
49. Mark Drumbl, Put the Taliban on Trial - In Afghanistan; U.N. - Assisted Tribunals,
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Dec. 2, 2002, at Al3.
50. See Drumbl, supra note 49, at A13; Treyster, supra note 46, at 532. See also Steven Wilf,
Ownership and Protection of Heritage: Cultural Property Rights for the 21' Century: What is
Property's Fourth Estate? CulturalPropertyand the FiduciaryIdeal, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 177 (2001).
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suffering Afghans may have impeded the symbiotic growth of al-Qaeda and
Taliban power.
If proven, some of these crimes would constitute violations of customary
international law. Others would constitute gross human rights offenses, namely
serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights
law that, in turn, qualify as crimes under international law. Others would infringe
a number of international treaties and conventions. Full justice for all victims of
True
Taliban barbarity may therefore require more criminal prosecutions.
accountability would oblige the Taliban to answer to these charges in addition to
complicity in the September 11th attack.
Where should they be
Who should prosecute these alleged crimes?
adjudicated? For example, could U.S. federal courts exercise universal jurisdiction
to adjudicate criminally regarding torture? Alternately, there is a possibility of
civil lawsuits involving breaches of the law of nations undertaken pursuant to the
federal Alien Tort Claims Act or Torture Victim Protection Act. 5 1 Given the
difficulties that inhere enforcing any actual damage award, these claims could be
limited to providing victims with symbolic justice. Foreign national courts - in
particular, in Belgium, Switzerland and Germany - have been active in exercising
universal jurisdiction to criminally prosecute human rights abusers.52 The planned
U.S. military commissions appear unable to exercise universal jurisdiction over the
In all cases, and regardless of jurisdictional
Taliban's "other" crimes.53
possibilities, it appears doubtful that there is a political commitment to pursue
these crimes in the U.S. or through military prosecutions.54
Perhaps an international tribunal created by the Security Council would be
appropriate. Alternately, these may be the kinds of crimes that U.N.-assisted
tribunals in Afghanistan should address. Such tribunals could involve Afghan
jurists and inclusively invoke Afghan custom, Islamic law, and public international
law. In this vein, perhaps prosecutions of al-Qaeda operatives should be viewed
differently than those of Taliban officials. Although the U.S. legitimately asserts a
strong interest in prosecuting al-Qaeda operatives committing attacks within the
U.S., and the international community calls for the condemnation of terrorism as a
crime against humanity, it seems that Afghanistan is the place with the greatest
interest in prosecuting Taliban leaders for their overall pattern of criminality. Such
prosecutions could form an important part of nation-building in Afghanistan. They
could also help to construct a domestic judicial system, thwart the impunity that
has marked much of Afghan history, and promote the rule of law. They could also

51. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350 (2002).
52. See Beth Van Schaack, InternationalLaw Weekend Proceedings: The Civil Enforcement of
Human Rights Norms In Domestic Courts, 6 ILSA J INT'L & COMP L 295, 296-98 (2000). See also
Monica Hans, Providingfor Uniformity in the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction: Can Either the
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction or an InternationalCriminal Court Accomplish this

Goal?, 15

TRANSNAT'L LAW. 357

(2002).

53. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Agora: Military Commissions: JurisdictionOf MilitaryCommissions and
The Ambiguous War On Terrorism, 96 A.J.I.L. 345 (2002).
54. See generally Paust, supra note 19.
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form an important forum in which globalized human rights law is sedimentarily
layered upon Islamic law (as locally followed) in which both meet as "equal
strangers" and thereby build a universal rule of law. One of the greatest challenges
of human rights law is shedding its perceived status as a Western meta-narrative to
which other local narratives are subaltern. Prosecuting the Taliban's international
crimes committed locally in Afghanistan against Afghans could be a thoughtful
exercise in this reconciliation and harmonization process.
The Taliban's "other" crimes, committed systematically over a number of
years, should not be overlooked. Giving succor to terrorists is only one part of the
Taliban's litany of criminality. In avenging our own victimization we should not
brush aside the many other victims. It would be unfair for us to exercise primacy
and exclusivity over captured Taliban officials and try them only for the September
l1th attack. Doing so "hides" the Taliban's crimes when committed against
"others" as opposed to "us." Instead, we should endeavor to coordinate our needs
for justice with those felt by others. Only then would the Taliban face a thorough
accounting.
In conclusion, legal responses to the September 11 attack could operate at a
multiplicity of levels. Senior al-Qaeda leaders could face an international tribunal
charging them with crimes against humanity. Lower-level terrorists could be
processed through national court systems adjusted for national security concerns.
Taliban officials could face the Afghan people they have brutalized in U.N.
assisted tribunals integrated with the process of Afghanistan's reconstruction and
stabilization. This polycentric approach may strike an effective balance among
various goals, namely punishing terrorists, deterring future breaches, protecting
national security interests, demystifying terrorist mystique, and constructing multiethnic governance in Afghanistan. Such a process can also establish linkages
between Islamic and Western legal communities. On the other hand, summarily
prosecuting in military commissions may erode the rule of law that painstakingly drop-by-drop and bit-by-bit - has been built since Nuremberg. Ultimately, this
erosion may be precisely what terrorists perversely hoped for.
In thinking about how we respond to terrorism today, we need to be mindful
of the future effects our actions have on legalism and international rule of law.
The post-Nuremberg era has seen the gradual emergence in international relations
of what political theorist Judith Shklar calls "legalism" - "the ethical attitude that
holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to
consist of duties and rights determined by rules." "5 Legalism includes an important
element of process and has come into play even "when so doing has greatly
complicated international diplomacy. 56 Law has attempted, principally through
the vehicle of international human rights and international criminal law, to answer
complex problems of violence, hatred, and aggression. The reaction to massacre in
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and East Timor has been legalist, despite the fact

55. See generally JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1 (1986).
56. See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 20,24,280 (2000).
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that "this legalism may sometimes seem eccentric [or] absurdly pious."
Response to the atrocity of September 11 th - whether on the level of modifying the
rules regarding self-defense, avoiding strict adherence to Security Council
approval of the use of force, demonstrating diffidence regarding the Geneva
Conventions, or the exceptional use of military commissions - may signify a
movement away from legalism.

57. BASS, supra note 56, at 281.

